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Introduction
In 1994, the Palestinian Liberation Organization signed on the Paris Protocol, an annex
concerning economic relations between Israel and Palestine. The main objective was to “establish
a sound economic base for Israel and Palestine by the principles of mutual respect of each other’s
economic interests, reciprocity, equity and fairness.” 1 To fulfill this purpose, the Palestinian
Monetary Authority (PMA) was established along with the current standing government, the
Palestinian Authority (PA). Although the annex provided the PMA with most of the traditional
functions of a central bank, its mandate was truncated by the Occupation to compromise its
capacity to act as a full-fledged bank. Twenty years later, Palestine still lacks a central bank and
its own sovereign currency. Palestine, a developing country with exceptional war circumstances,
is missing the most essential components of a functioning economy.
There is extensive literature on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that studies the historic,
political, and social aspects. However, few scholars have examined the economic model that was
born out of the conflict and the various implications behind it. According to Charles Goodhart: “A
Central Bank has two main functions. Its first (macro-economic) function is the operation of
discretionary monetary policy” and a “second (micro-economic) function, of providing support
(e.g., via Lender of Last Resort assistance), and regulatory and supervisory services to maintain
the health of the banking system”2. However, with the Israeli Occupation’s imposed restrictions

1

Palestine. Government of the State of Israel and the P.L.O., Representing the Palestinian People. The
Palestinian-Israeli Interim Agreement on the West Bank & the Gaza Strip ANNEX V: Protocol on
Economic Relations. April 9, 1994. Accessed February 9, 2016.
http://www.nad-plo.org/userfiles/file/Document/ParisPro.pdf.
2
Charles Goodhart. Money, Information and Uncertainty. (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1989), 176
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on the PMA, the latter falls short in carrying out either. Palestine’s regulatory body does not have
the monetary tools to tackle macroeconomic targets such as price stability, or achieve
microeconomic objectives such as serving commercial banks. Thus, Palestine, does not have
institutional and policy support to weather times of crisis and growth. This paper will examine two
related monetary issues: First is the role central banks and sovereign currencies have in regulating
and stimulating their respective economies. The second is the relationship between monetary
sovereignty and state independence. The relationship between the two, including that between
their monetary and fiscal authorities, will be illustrated throughout this project.
The first chapter will offer a brief history of money in Palestine and draw a timeline of all
the currencies and monetary systems that took place after the dismantling of the British mandate
and the establishment of Israel in 1948 up until the creation of the PMA in 1994. This chapter will
provide the necessary context to understand the current situation by reviewing the Paris Protocol
which laid the foundation for Palestine’s economy today. The second chapter will study the ways
in which the PMA tries to fulfill its role as Palestine’s central bank. It will do so by showing the
most recent accomplishments and initiatives to motivate, facilitate and regulate the growth of the
Palestinian banking sector under most adverse conditions. Unfortunately, little work has been done
to critically study the PMA’s function and impact in the Palestinian economy. However, this
chapter outlines the basic stylized facts about the tools available for the PMA to influence and
regulate the economy.
The third chapter tackles the question: why are central banks necessary? The debate in the
literature presents different views about the need for central banks and monopolized currencies. A
set of alternative monetary arrangements throughout history will be discussed in the chapter. The
purpose is to examine how monetary systems with and without central banks have contributed to
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shaping the economy and, eventually, the realization of political sovereignty. By analyzing cases
of economies without a central bank or a sovereign currency, we were able to better understand
the implications behind the current economic model in Palestine.
What emerges out of this project is an understanding of how the Paris Protocol produced
an economic relationship between Palestine and Israel that only serves the interests of the latter. I
will illustrate the similarities between today’s Palestine and former colonized countries in respect
to their monetary and fiscal systems. So far, the economic gap between the two countries has only
grown wider, and we will examine the reasons behind this disparity.

Awartani 4

Chapter One: History of Money in Palestine
The British Mandate (1917-1948)
In 1917, Britain took over Palestine as a result of the Sykes-Picot agreement between the
Allies after World War. The British Mandate allowed circulation of the Ottoman currency until it
announced the Egyptian Lira and British Pound as legal tender in January 12, 1918. Interestingly
enough, it was the British Mandate which made the word masari one of the most famous slang
words in Arabic. People said masari in reference to Masr, the Arabic word for Egypt. However,
similarly to India, Syria, and the rest of the British colonies at that time, Palestine received a
currency board system (CBS) in 1926 from the British Secretary of State for the Colonies. The
Board’s activities, fully independent from the local government, were confined to issuing currency
banknotes which were backed by an equivalent amount of Sterling in London. Excess sterling
reserves were placed in the London Money Market for investment which in return accumulated
sterling based investments to back the Palestine Pound. On February 7, 1927, the Currency Board
started printing Palestine Pounds which were divided into 1000 mils. The currency was issued in
denomination of 500mils, thus available currency values were £1, £5, £10, £50, and £100.3
On May 15, 1948, the British Mandate declared its withdrawal from Palestine, and Israel
was declared a Jewish state. Millions of Palestinians either fled or were expelled from their homes.
In accordance with the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians, the Palestine Pound was taken out of
circulation upon the emergence of the Israeli State. Under direction from the British Mandate, over

3

Ottensooser, Robert David. The Palestine Pound and the Israel Pound; Transition from a Colonial to an
Independent Currency. (Genève: E. Droz, 1955), 109
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59 million Palestine Pounds were taken out of circulation. For the remainder of Palestinians, the
British Mandate offered to purchase Palestine Pounds in exchange for English Sterling. Israel, on
the other hand, confiscated Palestinian bank accounts and property under the pretense of holding
“absentee” property. The Custodian of Absentee Property (CAP), a member of the Israeli
government, deals exclusively with the property left behind by Palestinian refugees. The CAP
passed a law to seize all Palestinian bank accounts and transfer the money to the Israeli Custodian,
including all content in safe deposit boxes. All regional banks followed the order with the
exception of the Arab Bank. Palestinians were denied access to their checking and savings
accounts except Arab Bank’s clients. Not only did Israel seize bank accounts, but it also froze all
Palestinian investments and checks issued to Palestinian businessmen and corporation to transfer
them into the CAP. Those investments mainly consisted of share certificates and British
government-issue bearer bonds.4

Figure 1: This picture shows an issued note of £1 Palestine Pound in 1944. It is interesting to note that British Mandate
included Hebrew writings along Arabic and English. This shows that the British Mandate was already planning on
accommodating a Jewish State in Palestine long before its establishment in 1948.
Source: http://arabnyheter.info/sv/2014/02/03/palestine-banknotes-one-palestine-pound-note-of-1944-palestine-currencyboard/

4

Ibid., 111
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Jordanian Rule (1948-1967)
With the establishment of Israel as a state on approximately a third of Palestinian land, the
areas where Palestine Pound dominated as legal tender were now divided into several differently
governed entities: the State of Israel, the Jordanian-occupied West Bank, the Hashemite Kingdom
of Jordan, and the Egyptian-occupied Gaza Strip. The West Bank, which lies east of the Jordan
valley and west of the newly founded Israel was annexed to Jordan and the Gaza Strip was annexed
to Egypt.
With the new political geography emerged a new currency system that accommodated each
of the new political entities. In Israel, there was a transitional period of four years between the end
of the British Mandate and the adoption of a fully independent currency system. Between 1948
and 1952, the Palestine pound continued to be legal tender. In August 1948, the Jewish Agencyowned company called Anglo Palestine Company issued new banknotes. The Jordanian dinar
replaced the Palestine Pound in the West Bank in 1949. The West Bank was officially annexed to
Jordan by 1950 and that is when the Palestine pound stopped circulating. In the Gaza Strip, the
Palestine pound continued to circulate until it was replaced by the Egyptian pound in April 1951.
That is three years after the Egyptian army took control of the territory.5
Israeli Occupation (1967-1994)
In 1967, after what is known as the Six Day War, Israel occupied the entirety of the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip. The Jordanian Dinar continued to be legal tender in addition to the Israeli
Shekel, which had been introduced by the Israeli military rule. Salaries of the civil service
employees in the West Bank and Gaza Strip were paid in shekel, while salaries of employees who

5

Ibid., 113
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were hired by Jordan prior to the occupation continued to be paid in Jordanian Dinars. A large
number of these employees continued to receive two salaries for more than three decades: one in
Dinars from Jordan and one in Shekel from the Occupying authority. The payment of Jordanian
salaries was carried out by networks of certified agents or middlemen, money changers, who used
to cash the salaries in Jordan on behalf of the employees and deliver the money in cash to their
respective localities against a certain commission.6
The same situation prevailed in the Gaza Strip. The Israeli Army allowed mobility of goods
and between Gaza and the West Bank under certain “security” arrangements and permits. In Gaza,
the Jordanian Dinar, the Israeli shekel and the Egyptian Pound were all legal tender.
It is only in 1984 that the first regional bank was allowed to operate in the West Bank, by
allowing the Arab Bank to reopen one of 1st branches in the city of Ramallah. In subsequent years,
branches like the Bank of Jordan and Cairo Amman were allowed to operate through local
branches in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.7
Oslo Accords & Economic Relations of Paris Protocol (1994)
In 1994 the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) met with Israeli representatives in
Paris to construct a treaty dedicated to ameliorating the economic situation in both the West Bank
and Israel after the Israeli occupation period. Its aim was also to ensure future prospect for both
economies based on common understanding and consent. As mentioned in the preamble, the
“protocol establishes the contractual agreement that will govern the economic relations between
the two sides and will cover the West Bank and the Gaza Strip during the interim period.” It is

6
7

Ibid., 114
Ibid., 117
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important to note that the Paris Protocol was established to cover a five-year interim period. The
interim period was supposed to be the time until the PLO gained full sovereignty and established
a state of Palestine by 2000. The annex was made of eleven articles. The articles read as follows:
● Article I- Framework and the Scope of this Protocol
● Article II- The Joint Economic Committee
● Article III- Import Taxes and Import Policy
● Article IV- Monetary and Financial Issues
● Article V- Direct Taxation
● Article VI- Indirect Taxes on Local Production
● Article VII- Labor
● Article VIII- Agriculture
● Article IX- Industry
● Article X- Tourism
● Article XI- Insurance Issues
As seen from the articles above, the protocol more or less covers and dictates all aspects of
the Palestinian economy. Given the focus of this paper, I will mostly examine Article IV regarding
monetary and financial issues. The opening statement in Article IV declared that: “the Palestinian
Authority will establish a Monetary Authority (PMA) in the Areas. The PMA will have the powers
and responsibilities for the regulation and implementation of the monetary policies within the
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functions described in this Article.”8 The protocol was also responsible for setting up the legal and
operational framework in which the Palestinian Monetary Authority could use to regulate and
develop its own economy. Under the impression that they were drawing a plan for a transitory
period to full sovereignty, the PLO agreed on numerous monetary and fiscal limitations in order
to establish the “Palestinian Authority” in the future. It also gave up on its financial sovereignty
by consenting to a half-fledged central bank, which is the PMA.
Article IV set the legal and operational mandate for the PMA as a central bank like entity
in Palestine. However, the official designated authority of the PMA does not originate, legally
speaking, from the Paris Protocol but from the presidential order of Yasser Arafat to issue Law
Number Two in 1997. The second article of the Law 1997 states: “An authority called the
Palestinian Monetary Authority shall hereby be established with the status of an independent legal
entity and full legal capacity to engage in all the activities and actions necessary to achieve the
objectives for which it was established, including acquisition of the real estate and movable
property necessary to carry out its work, in accordance with the provisions of the law.”9
In Article 5 of Law 1997 called Objectives, Duties, and Powers of the Monetary Authority the
following has been stated:
1. Issue the national currency and coins in due course, in accordance with the terms and conditions
to be determined by the law on issuing currency and securing the required cash reserves.
2. Regulate banking activities, issue and cancel bank licenses, control and supervise banks, and
impose penalties on them.
8

Palestine. Government of the State of Israel and the P.L.O., Representing the Palestinian People. The
Palestinian-Israeli Interim Agreement on the West Bank & the Gaza Strip ANNEX V: Protocol on
Economic Relations. April 9, 1994. Accessed February 9, 2016.
9

Palestinian Monetary Authority. Law No.2 of 1997. West Bank, Ramallah, 1997.
http://www.pma.ps/Portals/1/Users/002/02/2/Legislation/Laws/Law_No_2_of_1997_on_Palestinian_Mon
etary_Authority.pdf (accessed November 6, 2015).
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3. Prepare, regulate and publish the balance of payments.
4. Provide liquidity to banks within the legally established limits.
5. Develop and implement regulations, decrees, and instructions to ensure maintenance of an
effective, secure and sounding banking system.
6. Regulate activities of money-changers
7. Serve as the bank for licensed banks
8. Serve as financial agent to the National Authority and Palestinian public institutions inside and
outside Palestine
9. Maintain and manage the National Authority’s reserve of gold and foreign currencies
10. Provide financial and economic advice to the National Authority, carry out economic and
monetary analyses on a regular basis, and publish the results.
11. Serve as financial agent to the National Authority and Palestinian public institutions inside and
outside Palestine.
12. Develop and implement regulations, decrees and instructions to ensure maintenance of an
effective, secure and sound banking system.
13. Regulate the quantity, quality, and cost of credit in order to meet the requirements of economic
growth and monetary stability, in accordance with the provisions of the Currency and Credit Law.
14. Serve as the bank of licensed banks, specialized lending institutions, and finance companies
and supervise them to ensure the soundness of their financial position and the protection of
depositors’ rights.
15. Regulate activities of money-changers, finance companies and development and investment
funds; issue them the relevant licenses, and control and supervise them.
16. Carry out any other tasks assigned to it by any relevant legislation, law, or agreement, provided
that they do not conflict with the provisions of this law. 10
The listed mandate by the presidential law is very similar to that of the Paris Protocol. It
can be noticed that this law provided the PMA with enough discretion to operate as a full-fledged
central bank. It supposedly has the jurisdiction to be the “banks’ bank” and to finance the state.

10

These were directly extracted from Article 5 of Law 1997, issued by a Presidential Decree from Yassir
Arrafat.
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However, in the following chapter we will examine the extent to which the PMA can practice its
designated responsibilities from the Paris Protocol and the PA issued Law.
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Chapter Two: Palestinian Monetary Authority
This chapter will offer a brief review of all the duties the PMA took part in as the regulatory
body in Palestine’s economy. Although some of these tasks fall under a modest scope of discretion
compared to other full-fledged central banks, they show the degree of involvement the PMA has
in the economy and the extent of its policy capabilities. The scarcity of literature on the
performance and accomplishments of the PMA made this chapter heavily reliant on PMA
published reports including their Annual Report and Financial Stability Report. Although they do
not provide in-depth information on the PMA’s role in either the public or financial sector, they
provide insight into how the PMA contributed in sustaining and regulating the Palestinian
economy.
The Palestinian Monetary Authority in the Financial Sector
As Karnovitz mentioned, “today’s banking system necessitates a central bank.”11 In this
section we will examine how the PMA fulfils such responsibility with the limited jurisdiction it
has. As seen earlier, the Palestinian Authority’s Law of 1997 has granted the PMA with the needed
discretion to properly support and protect the Palestinian banking system. However, as the
Occupation continues to forcefully halt such efforts, the PMA’s role remains passive as it attempts
to regulate the banking system with minimal powers. Nevertheless, as the PMA put it:
The financial sector’s infrastructure, primarily composed of regulatory and supervisory
framework and operating system, is considered a fundamental prerequisite to financial
11

Karnovitz, Alan. "An Assessment of Alternative Monetary Regimes for a Future Palestinian State:
Dollarization versus a National Currency." Modernizing Financial Institutions (MFI: 2010), 4
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stability. The PMA continues to make efforts that directly contribute to complete the
foundation of this infrastructure and upgrade its capabilities, thereby supporting and
promoting financial stability.12
The following are some of the initiatives the PMA has taken to improve and guarantee the
soundness of the banking system.
 Regulatory and Supervisory Framework

It could be noticed that the PMA compensates its lack of monetary powers by an
exceptional administrative role in the banking system. During the past five years, the PMA issued
at least ten instructions to help supervise the banking system and facilitate its activities. They all
vary in their scope of focus, but they can be briefly summarized as such:


Instruction No. (1/2014): concerning the logistics of transporting money, precious metals
and valuables. The PMA purchased specialized vehicles to secure on-land transactions
between banks.



Instruction No. (2/2014): concerning the regulation of housing and mortgage loans based
on the dynamic loan-to-value ratio. The PMA implemented an LtV ratio for banks to adopt
in the process of giving out mortgages to reduce default risks. Commercial banks are
prohibited from giving out mortgage loans to customers who score below the LtV ratio
threshold.



Instruction No. (3) and (4) concern facilitating the launch of the the new real-time gross
settlement system, BURAQ. This system will be later discussed in detail.

12

Annual Report 2014: September." Palestine Monetary Authority (PMA), September 2014. Accessed
November 17, 2015, 86
http://pma.ps/Portals/1/Users/002/02/2/Publications/English/Annual Reports/PMA Annual
Reports/Annual_Report_2014_Final_En.pdf.pdf.
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The rest of the instructions revolve around micro-regulatory rules the PMA set for
Palestinian banks.



Instruction No. (5/2014): to set official bank working days and hours.



Instruction No. (6/2014): concerning credit granted to related parties. In efforts to avoid
conflict of interest and corruption, the PMA set rules for credit granted by banks to their
working members.



Instruction No. (7/2014): is for categorizing fees and commissions and setting permissible
ceilings for service fees charged by banks to their clients



Instruction No. (8/2014): lowered the risk reserve rate from 2 percent to 1.5 granting the
0.5 percent for indirect credit facilities.



Instruction No. (9/2014): concerning the management of the deceased’s account to prevent
any financial schemes by outside parties.



Instruction No. (10/2014): involves bank stress testing which is a mandatory procedure
imposed by the PMA to ensure the performance of banks in the times of crisis (i.e. war
occurrence, economic shock, etc…)

13

It is evident that the PMA, as a financial regulator, seeks to micromanage the banking
system through very specific instructions regarding everyday operations. The extent in which the
PMA involves itself in banking policies shows its exceptional protectiveness over the financial
system. Two reasons surface as to why the PMA is so rigorously strict with its financial
institutions. First are the war circumstances in which the Palestinian economy functions under.

13

Financial Stability Report 2014: September." Palestine Monetary Authority (PMA), September 2014.
Accessed November 9, 2015, 20
http://pma.ps/Portals/1/Users/002/02/2/Publications/English/Annual Reports/PMA Annual
Reports/Annual_Report_2014_Final_En.pdf.pdf.
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Both the public and private sector are constantly exposed to potential political crises and economic
shocks, such as the fiscal crisis in 2006 or the Gaza War in 2008 and 2012. Having limited powers
to accommodate such economic setbacks, the PMA tends to take exceptionally strict measures to
primitively protect the financial system against unexpected hits. Another reason behind PMA’s
noticeably disciplined approach is to prove its competence amongst other international institutions
as parts of its efforts to become afull-fledged Central Bank. It can be observed from the narrative
presented in the PMA’s published reports that it is constantly attempting to implement programs
and strategies that are complementary to international standards. Despite the effectiveness of such
efforts, as both the International Monetary Fund and the World commend the PMA’s performance
on annual basis, it brought no change to its policy mandate.
 Establishment of the Palestine Deposit Insurance Corporation:
As Asli Kunt noted “deposit insurance has become an increasingly used tool by
governments in an effort to assure the stability of banking system and protect bank depositors from
incurring large losses due to bank failures.”14 Following the international efforts to develop deposit
insurance corporations, the PMA launched the Palestine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC).
In their Financial Stability Report of 2013, the PMA briefly listed its initiatives and
accomplishment in regulating and developing the financial sector. However, in this section the
PMA noted that “these achievements served to meet the requirements for transforming the PMA

Demirgüç-Kunt, Aslı, Edward Kane, Baybars Karacaovali, and Luc Laeven. "Deposit Insurance around
the World: A Comprehensive Database." Deposit Insurance around the World Issues of Design and
Implementation, 2008, 4
14
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into a modern and full-fledged central bank. Perhaps the most prominent accomplishments was
the establishment of the Palestine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC)” 15
The main aim behind creating the PDIC, according to the PMA, was to “protect depositors
in accordance with a deposit insurance ceiling set forth by law, thereby reinforcing confidence in
the Palestinian banking system” 16 The PDIC was backed by a Presidential Decree to grant it the
legal discretion to operate fully independent of both the banking system and the government.
However, in their first year the PDIC was able to set an insurance ceiling of $10,000 to every bank
account in Palestine. This left approximately 93% of bank depositors in the West Bank covered by
the PDIC’s insurance policies. Thus, the creation of the PDIC falls under the PMA’s efforts to
“mobilize savings, promote economic growth, enhance financial stability, and bolster confidence
in the Palestinian financial and banking systems.”17
 The Electronic National Switch (ENS)
The PMA successfully managed to unify its ATM Machines as well as Point of Sales
(PoSs) into a single database. This made access to cash much more efficient for citizens as it
provided the service regardless of time and location. According to the PMA this “system will
encourage the banks to issue more debit and prepaid card and will also encourage the distribution
of the point of sale machines.”18 This is part of PMA’s recent efforts to gradually replace the use
of cash in Palestine with advanced payment methods, including digital checks, electronic wallets,

15

Ibid.
Ibid., 21
17
Ibid., 22
18
Ibid., 24
16
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and mobile payments. Introducing the ENS establishes an infrastructure for such transition as it
aims to reduce the risk of fraud and abuse from using technological payment systems.
 The Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
With the switch to more digital means of payment, comes the need for a secure transaction
medium. In order to ensure the safety of the electronic exchanges, the PMA introduced an
encryption system as a way “to manage the creation, administration, distribution and revocation
of keys and digital certificates.” 19 (Website) Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is an encryption
system that “supports the distribution and identification of public encryption keys, enabling users
and computers to both securely exchange data over networks such as the Internet and verify the
identity of the other party.”

20

It also helped secure global transactions going in and out of

Palestine.21
 The Automated Clearance System

To further secure payment mechanisms the PMA launched a new automated clearance
system called Perago Clear in 2014. According to the PMA this automated clearance system’s
“main function is to provide safe and effective check-clearing processes while also securing retail
payment transactions in the Palestinian service sector.” 22 Perago does so by supervising and
keeping track of check-clearing operations and retail payment instruments. 23

19

"What Is PKI (public Key Infrastructure)? - Definition from WhatIs.com." SearchSecurity. Accessed
May 04, 2016. http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/PKI.
20

"PMA Implements First Step toward Foundation of Public Key Infrastructure." PMA Press Releases.
Accessed May 04, 2016. http://www.pma.ps/Default.aspx?tabid=205.
21

22

Ibid.
PMA Press Releases. Accessed March 12, 2016. http://www.pma.ps/Default.aspx?tabid=205.Web

23

Ibid., 25
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 Development of the Credit Bureau System
In an economy that is constantly going under recessions and setbacks, Palestinian
merchants, commercial banks, and individuals need to take extra precautionary measures before
placing their investments. To help secure future investments from default risks and fraud the PMA
took the initiative to establish a credit bureau system. Credit bureau are agencies that look and
research into individual and corporation credit information and sells it for a fee to potential
creditors. The main purpose of credit bureaus is to provide viable information to credit agencies
in order for them to make sound lending decisions. Parties that use credit bureau agencies are
usually banks, mortgage lenders, financing companies and credit card companies. Of course, credit
bureau agencies have no part in making lending decisions, but their main purpose is to provide
credit score and logs of potential clients.24
Banks in Palestine now have the option to enroll in a Unified Query System where they
have access to “check costumer’s scores on the Bounced Checks System, request details of the
costumer’s rating, know whether the customer is a loan grantee of banks or lending institution,
establish whether the costumers has unpaid due installments and finally check the customer’s
overall credit history.”25According to the PMA this will boost confidence by local and outside
investors in the financial sector as the credit bureau system will gradually become more efficient
and accurate in providing detailed credit ratings.

24

"Credit Reporting Agency Definition | Investopedia." Investopedia. 2008. Accessed March 03, 2016.
Web http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/credit-reporting-agency.asp.
25

"Financial Stability Report 2013: September." Palestine Monetary Authority (PMA), September 2013.
Accessed November 9, 2015, 87
http://www.pma.ps/Portals/1/Users/002/02/2/Publications/English/Annual%20Reports/Financial%20Stabi
lity%20Reports/Financial_Stability_Report_English_Final_web_2013.pdf
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Financial Inclusion and Small to Medium Enterprises (SMEs)
Not only is Palestine considered to be an underdeveloped country but it faces a set of
exceptional challenges as it lives in the shadows of occupation. War circumstances, along with
poor living standards, has minimized the public’s awareness of the world of finance. The political
complexity has generated a lot of physical and economic obstacles for non-privileged Palestinians
to access financial services and institutions. As part of its responsibility to stimulate and sustain
economic growth, the PMA has launched a financial inclusion program aimed to raise public
awareness and facilitate access to financial services in rural areas. To further evaluate this initiative
one has to fully understand the meaning of financial inclusion. There is no definitive meaning
behind it, but taking the definition generated by the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP)
organization; financial inclusion “means that households and businesses have access and can
effectively use appropriate financial services. Such services must be provided responsibly and
sustainably, in a well-regulated economy.”26 The PMA has used this rhetoric to establish their own
idea of financial inclusion to be defined as “enhancing the access to the financial services for all
the groups in the society, with fair, transparent, and affordable costs.” 27
The PMA has made several efforts to carry out the financial inclusion mission across the
country. It launched programs that target both potential investors and regular citizens. The PMA
recognizes the importance of supporting small enterprises and startups. Small to Medium

26

Wang, Xiu Hua, and Fadi Hassan Shihadeh. "Financial Inclusion: Policies, Status, and Challenges in
Palestine." International Journal of Economics and Finance IJEF 7, no. 8 (2015), 199
27

PMA Press Releases. Accessed March 08, 2016. http://www.pma.ps/Default.aspx?tabid=205. Web.
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Enterprises (SMEs) contribute around 55% of the GDP and make 91% of businesses in Palestine.28
To support startup businesses, the PMA has hosted an international banking conference titled
“Empowering Small and Medium Enterprises in Palestine through Enhancing Access to Finance”
which aimed at assessing the financial needs for small businesses and granting them access as
such. The PMA has also encouraged the reduction of interest rates and easing the attached
conditions to structured loans granted to small enterprises. Given its compromised mandate the
PMA uses its only tool to do encourage lending by exempting commercial banks from the 2% risk
reserve requirement to any loanable funds or financial services provided for small enterprises. The
PMA has also established a database for all SMEs in order to boost bank efficiency in lending
startups. Banks have access to database that helps them map the financial needs of small businesses
and thus offer the suitable instruments and services.
The PMA has also launched an awareness campaign that involves international and local
banks setting up educational programs to inform the public about their services. Banks from all
over the West Bank have annually hosted thousands of students to lecture them about the nature
of banking and finance. Banks also launched programs where staff members visit schools and hold
information sessions to students and school staff. With the sponsorship of the PMA, banks from
different branches visited more than 1,600 schools in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to meet
with more than 87,000 students. The campaign also aimed at empowering inexperienced small
shareholders by informing them about their rights, voting mechanism and ordinary & extraordinary
meetings of the General Authority. 29 The PMA also launched a campaign under the name of
“Primary Account for Each Citizen” which aims to optimize the number of people using financial
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services by reducing access barriers. Low-income Palestinian citizens have very minimal to no
knowledge about how banking works, which in return discourages them to make bank deposits.
The PMA attempted to encourage lending and borrowing by instructing commercial banks to
reduce paperwork as much as possible. People who are unaware of banking processes are
intimidated by the bureaucracy. The ultimate purpose of this initiative was to facilitate and
encourage the use of financial instruments in the Palestinian economy. By spreading awareness
about the nature of banking and investments, while also providing access to those who lack the
financial or physical means, the PMA was able to take the first step to improve Palestine’s socioeconomic status.
Handling War Crisis in Gaza (2014)
One of the many duties a central bank has as the regulatory body of the economy is crisis
management. However, with the case of Palestine its monetary authority, two exceptions fall into
place. The first is the nature in which the PMA is designed, and the mandate it is given. In
comparison to the average central bank, the PMA’s power and influence are very much
compromised by the political and economic constraints imposed by the Israeli Occupation.
Second, the unique political and economic situation in Palestine, the definition of “crisis” is very
much war oriented. Despite functioning under occupation, the PMA has to sustain the economy
with what it has of monetary, institutional and fiscal tools. Gracianna Del Castillo discussed the
role of central banks and governments during the post-war economic recovery period. She argues
that:
Policymakers adopting monetary in such situations may consider broader objectives –
including growth employment and most importantly, the financing of peace-related project
in cases where foreign financing is lagging. Without the possibility of financing critical
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project, the whole peace process may collapse. Thus, deficit financing should increase
policymakers’ options in particular cases in the transition from war.30
In 2014, Israel launched a military attack on Gaza leaving the city’s infrastructure and its people
in complete devastation. The economic repercussions of these attacks produced a city with the
highest unemployment in the world. In 2014, the World Bank reported that Gaza holds an
unemployment rate of 48% making it “have higher unemployment than any other economy in the
world”31 However, neither the Palestinian Authority nor the PMA have the jurisdiction to finance
“peace-related projects” or target unemployment like Castillo suggested. Instead, the Gaza
economy’s recovery was dependent on insufficient foreign grants that were highly contingent on
specific political terms. The war on Gaza was a prime time to test the extent in which the PMA
can carry out a central bank’s most essential duties – to aid the economy in times of crisis.
Nevertheless, as soon as Israel started its military aggression against the Gaza Strip, the PMA
set up a “crisis management cell” to aid the economy and try to soften the disaster. The PMA
designated team worked hand in hand with commercial banks in Gaza and the West Bank to
coordinate a plan to minimize the war impact on the Gaza banking system. The following list was
taken directly from the PMA annual report which lists the initiatives and measures it took during
war:
 Enactment of bank business continuity plans and convening consultancy meetings on a

daily basis.
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 Supplying branches with necessary means to ensure business continuity (electrical

generators, fuel).
 Provision of sufficient liquidity in advance of the crisis. The PMA does so by setting up

theoretical economic scenarios, crises included, based on the initial global economy’s
performance and accordingly tests the reserves of each bank to determine if they’re
successful in backing their liquidity in times of crisis.
 Distributing cash across branches in case of emergency and avoiding cash concentration at

near-border branches.
 Feeding ATMs with cash as required and ensuring adequate liquidity.
 Ensuring the possibility of cash withdrawal from different points of sale.
 Reinforcing security and safety procedures.
 Timely decision-making (working hours and closure of branches in periods of ceasefire as

agreed upon).
 Offering directions to customers seeking banking services, and identifying the bank

branches and offices and ATMs to be visited during the war.
On the other hand, the PMA made important decisions to organize banking with regards to
clearance, payment and settlement systems and credit rating. These were as follows:
 Suspending the collection of bounced checks fees from check issuers.
 Suspending credit rating using the bounced check system.
 Suspending credit rating for borrowers (individuals, companies and institutions).
 Waiving conditions on mortgage loans for loans obtained through credit rating based on

the LTV ratio.

Awartani 24
 Granting borrowers wider-ranging allowances by raising the ratio of monthly installments

to total income from 50 percent to 65 percent.
 Postponing installments due for private, corporate and institution debtors until the end of

2014.
 Suspending the collection of delay fees on postponed installments.32
Judging by this list it becomes obvious that the PMA’s role is far from a traditional monetary
authority as it has minimal discretion to carry out direct stimuli packages to either tackle
unemployment in Gaza or run a deficit to rebuild the city. Rather, the PMA acts as a supervisory
figure that functions in a passive manner. The PMA’s discretion goes as far as filling ATMs with
cash or prepare banks for crises by running stress tests, but it however lacks the very essence of a
central bank. The financial easing the PMA tries to provide in the time of crisis comes in the form
of late fee exemptions as mentioned above. Although this might be effective as it redeems people’s
financial commitments in the times of desperate need, it does not necessarily stimulate economic
growth or development. Moreover, the PMA tries to encourage lending and borrowing by
suspending credit rating to make financial instruments more accessible for people but again, this
is far from enough to the offset a 48% unemployment economy.
The International Monetary Fund’s Take on the PMA
Being marginalized by the Occupation, the PMA takes extra pride in international
recognition as it boosts its confidence in potentially transforming into a full-fledged central bank
in the future. The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have been working closely
with the PMA in the last decade to offer policy and financial guidance to better regulate the
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Palestinian economy. The IMF sends a mission on annual basis to examine the Palestinian
economy and evaluate the PMA’s performance as such. In their most recent reports, the IMF has
discussed several challenges that face the Palestinian economy, including the financial sector, the
public sector and the government’s balance of payments. Throughout their analysis, the IMF has
stressed the importance of Israel’s commitment to the Paris Protocol, especially in transferring
clearance revenues back to the PMA. Moreover, the IMF has commended the PMA’s performance
given the fiscal and monetary restrictions imposed by the Israeli occupation. The IMF stated
“despite the difficult economic and political situation in 2014, the fiscal authorities maintained
their efforts to deliver lower deficits.”33 This was mainly reflected on the clearance revenue growth
that outpaced budget projections, helped by a sharp rise in excise revenue collection.
The IMF’s statement also touches on the importance of continuing to safeguard the
financial stability in a volatile environment. An economy under war requires extra measures from
the PMA to maintain stability and ensure safety. According to the IMF, the PMA “has made
considerable progress in the area of risk-based supervision, upgrading its stress-test methodology,
and enhancing crisis preparedness.”
Besides the progress in risk management and crisis handling, the IMF also commended the PMA
for its efforts in installing the financial inclusion program. Given that Palestine is an
underdeveloped country, the majority of people lack awareness and access to financial services.
Thus the PMA has launched a financial inclusion strategy “that bodes well for efforts to enhance
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access to credit on more affordable terms to a wider share of population, including small- and
medium-sized business” as the IMF described it.
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Chapter Three: Central Banking
Central Banks have been hotly debated in the academic literature and policy circles. The
issue at hand has been not only how they function but whether they should even exist in the first
place. Some economists see benefits from having a central bank but disagree about its functions
and mandates. Other finds that, regardless of how well central bank try to operate, they are not
only unnecessary but indeed may be disrupting the free market self-regulatory mechanism.
Economists such as Kevin Dowd, Ludwig Von Mises, Milton Friedman, and Lawrence H. White
fall in the last tradition (even as they hail from different schools of thought). They generally
support the notion that central banks are unnecessary, since the economy would automatically
reach equilibrium if markets were given full autonomy in the absence of government intervention.
At the other end of the spectrum, authors like C.A.E Goodhart and Gunar Heinsohn find central
banks to be critical for a fully functioning economy, although the differ in their rationale behind
this position.
Starting with those who oppose central banks both as an institution and macroeconomic
mechanism, we begin with Kevin Dowd’s Automatic Stabilizing Mechanisms Under Free
Banking. In this paper Dowd draws a hypothetical scenario of a free banking system in which
banks, collectively, are responsible for issuing currency and running monetary policy. The aim of
his hypothesis is to prove how “a banking system would evolve in the absence of state
intervention” and to show that “automatic stabilizing mechanisms are inherent” 34 in such system.
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This doctrine follows the neoclassical model in which free markets are self-correcting and are
regulated by an “invisible hand.” He then uses the free banking system scenario as a benchmark
to assess the current economy, which is government-run via central banks.
He begins by establishing a system with the following distinctive features:
(1) multiple note issuers who would guarantee to redeem their notes in a commodity that
the community recognizes as valuable
(2) regular note exchange between these note issuers
(3) insertion of “option clauses” into the convertibility of contracts to protect the note
issuers against sudden excessive demands for liquidity.35
In his hypothetical scenario, Dowd shows that the natural emergence of all these banking practices
occurs without institutional or state intervention. His model is built on the assumption that all
market participants will pursue their self-interest and thus would want to maintain a credible
reputation in the market. Dowd argues that if the industry of minting currency was left for the
market, then equilibrium would be autonomously realized through free competition, thus drawing
the conclusion that a free banking system would be regulated by the forces of the free market. He
says:
The essential difference between free banking and central banking is that the latter
involves the suppression of stabilizing mechanisms that would arise spontaneously without
government interference. This strongly suggests that central banking is a destabilizing
form of state intervention.36
The idea behind this is that a free market system where suppliers compete with one another over
demandwill force market participants to take the necessary measures to assure their continuity.
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Adopting the free banking system as an example: if one bank over issues currency it will eventually
hurt its profits compared to other banks. This is due to the distinction Dowd draws between being
able to put money into the market and being able to make it stay. Banks can print as much currency
as they please, however, every bank is responsible for redeeming any unused currency they issue,
which ultimately eliminates any incentive for them to over-or-under issue. Dowd says: “a bank
would not deliberately choose to issue an excess of notes because they would not remain in
circulation long enough to justify the expense of putting them into circulation and then taking them
back again.”37 Following the same logic, Dowd believes that a system of issuing convertible notes,
a note-clearing mechanism, and the development of a liquidity market (substituting the central
bank’s open-market-operation and lenders of last resort function), would all emerge out of mere
necessity.
Dowd also touches on how the current central bank model hurts the economy’s
performance and its monetary system due to its exposure to exogenous forces by the government.
He says “history also confirms that the current monetary system is frequently unstable and very
different from the system that would have evolved in the absence of state interference.” 38 There
are several ways in which state intervention, according to Dowd, hurts the banking system and the
innately stable free-markets. He starts by stating that the creation of central banks and
monopolizing currency is a means for governments to optimize their revenue. He notes that such
a monopoly would not have existed. He said a government would impose this model by
“suppressing competition forcing its subject to accept a quality of service they would reject if they
had a wider freedom of choice.”39
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Dowd also believes that government intervention limits the capacity of the banking system
to develop and compromises its stability. He believes our current model suppresses the emergence
of a fully functioning clearing system. Unlike a free-banking system that would naturally lead
private banks to establish a clearing system, the government’s currency monopoly prevents such
a phenomenon from taking place, which in return “makes banks more vulnerable to shocks, thus
undermining the stability of the baking system.”40 With a multiple-bank issue economy, banks that
over-issue currency will be checked relatively quickly by the joint clearance system. However,
with a monopolized money issuer, there is no clearance system and instead the central bank would
directly redeem all notes returned by the public which will take relatively longer.
Another misuse of the government for its monopoly over the monetary system is the way
it uses its power to force banks into covering its spending in times of fiscal crises, such as times
of war. This further compromises the stability of the banking system as it pressures their reserves
and weakens their ability to absorb external shocks. Ultimately, this would by default lead
governments to intervene with the attempts of repairing the damage produced by their own policy.
This eventually creates a vicious cycle of bad decisions and monetary policies that only stemmed
by government intervention in the first place.
Dowd uses this to expand on the monopolistic nature of the current model, which is “clearly
unstable”, by showing how current monetary disturbances are symptoms for the lack of
competition a central bank has in issuing notes and restrictions. He says: “the lack of competitors
thus gives a monopoly bank of issue greater discretion than any competitive bank would have.”41
Although a typical orthodox approach would usually favor less regulation, Dowd is suggesting
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that in a competitive economy, market participants would have less leverage to misuse financial
instruments and are therefore tied to making sound decisions. This notion is the core of the
“invisible hand” concept where a free market under massive competition will regulate itself from
within. The higher the competition the smaller is the margin for market participants to implement
or adopt policies that might hurt the economy or the public interest as that will jeopardize their
continuity. This, however, does not apply to central banks as the regulatory force of free markets
is missing and is instead replaced with unlimited government discretion. Consequently, the
responsibility which would have been divided by the number of banks in the market is now in the
hands of a single currency issuer, the central bank.
We next turn to the father of monetarism: Milton Friedman, who is widely known for his
critical views on government intervention and its adverse effects on the economy. The reason why
economists like Milton Friedman oppose centralized monetary systems is because they believe
that the one-man model central banks function under is inefficient. When governments monopolize
issuing notes and monetary policies to one bank, it automatically places a huge burden on these
institutions to constantly try and do the “right thing”. In one of his interviews, when asked about
the current centralized banking system, Friedman said “a system that depends on the right man is
a bad system”42. The “right man” in this context is the government which attempts to regulate the
economy through a central bank. This, he says, is also dedicated to the Keynesian economists that
defend centralized economies by pointing fingers at government policies rather at the interference
itself. Friedman finds the very roots of this system to be flawed as the economy is hostage to the
government’s actions and policies. He continues to say that “we need to have a system that does
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not rely on the right man pushing the right buttons at the right time. We need a system that relies
on a framework that functions independently, an invisible hand mechanism.”43 Dowd backs up
claim by saying that the “problem of finding the right policy would soon become even more
difficult because the private banking system would adapt to the monopoly note issuer and
gradually force the monopoly bank into the role of ‘guardian’ of the monetary system.” 44 One can
conclude that from an orthodox point of view, centralized monetary systems are inefficient because
they mandate all monetary policy responsibility to one single institution. As a result, central banks
will always be in constant struggle to “find the right policy” he continues, “but the right policy
would be increasingly difficult to find.” In a free banking system under a decentralized monetary
system such responsibility will transform into a collective effort that is part of a self-regulatory
mechanism. jeopardise
Nevertheless, there is a reason why our current system works the way it does now. In his
analysis to the establishment of the European Union along the European Central Bank, Gunnar
Heinsohn presented a historical case for the rise of the Federal Reserve System from a multi-issue
bank system to gradually become monetarily centralized. He uses that to examine the reasons
behind such transformation and relates it to the current model in the European Union. It is safe to
say that the United States had no centralized monetary authority between the Federal Reserve Act
of 1913 and the Banking Act of 1935. The monetary authority then consisted of a Board of
Governors from Washington along twelve other regional Reserve Banks from different states.
These Reserve Banks were all somewhat semi-central banks since they had the power and
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discretion to set discount rates which at that time “was the primary tool of monetary policy.”45 Not
only so but the Board of Governors was secondary in the decision process as it could only issue a
policy under with full coordination with the twelve Reserve Banks. Moreover, Reserve Banks were
given the mandate to issue dollar notes. Although the system was not fully decentralized given the
presence of a governmental Board, but in reality the power to shape and form monetary policies
and currency was in the hands of the Reserve Banks. However, later on, with the discovery of the
open market operations in the 1920’s, Reserves Banks established an Open Market Investment
Committee (OMIC) in 1923. This committee included representatives from Boston, New York,
Philadelphia, Cleveland and Chicago Reserve Banks with the chairmanship of the New York Bank.
The objective behind this was to create a platform in which banks were able to interact without the
interference of the Board, and thus further decentralizing the baking system. The OMIC was
dismantled to be reestablished as the Open Market Policy Conference with the participation of all
twelve Reserve Banks. However, with the recession following the Great Depression the Reserve
Banking Act of 1933 established a new open market system named the Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC) with only the twelve presidents of the Reserve Banks but with the inclusion
of the Board of Governors even though “the governors did not get a vote in open market policy”46
It was only until the Banking Act of 1935 that change has been brought to the former
economic model by granting significant discretion to the Board. It did so by implementing major
reforms to the FOMC as it reduced the number of bank memberships from twelve to only five
presidents. It also buttressed the role of the Board by not only giving it the right to vote but a

45

Heinsohn, Gunnar, and Otto Steiger. The European Central Bank and the Eurosystem: An Analysis of
the Missing Central Monetary Institution in European Monetary Union. Bonn: Zentrum Für Europäische
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permanent majority in the committee itself. Moreover, the Act mandated the New York Bank with
exclusive rights to practice open market operations and the responsibility of being lender of last
resort to all other Reserve Banks with 40 percent of all assets. The other twelve banks, however,
maintained their right to issue notes. Surprisingly, economists like Milton Friedman welcomed
this change with appreciation as he and Anna Jacobson Schwartz wrote:
There was nothing that could be called a System policy. The System was demoralized.
Each Bank was operating on its own. All participated in the general atmosphere of panic
that was spreading in the financial community and the community at large. The leadership
which an independent central banking system was supposed to give the market and the
ability to withstand the pressures of politics and of profit alike and act counter to the market
as a whole, these- the justification for establishing a quasi-governmental institution with
broad powers- were conspicuous by their absence.47
According to Heinsohn the new Federal Reserve System following the Banking Act of
1935 was working so well that it became a benchmark for other decentralized systems around the
world including that of Europe’s at the time. However, it is obvious that the distinguishing feature
of the new American Federal system was the increased involvement of the government through
the reduction of Bank representatives and granting majority for the Board. Barry Eichengreen said:
“only after authority was definitely centralized in the hands of the Board of Governors and the
Federal Open Market Committee did the new institution finally come to operate smoothly” 48
Heinsohn’s paper studied the evolution of the Federal Reserve System from a free-banking
system to a centralized economy to assess the establishment of the European Union and the
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European Central Bank. The model in which the EU economy functions under is very similar to
that of the United States in the 1920’s. The discretion Reserve Banks had in tailoring monetary
policies and controlling the money supply, by depositing and issuing hard currency, is enjoyed by
the National Central Banks (NCBs) of the European Union. In its early years of establishment, the
European Central Bank was very much like the Board of Governors in the first Federal Reserve
System; secondary and marginalized. NCB’s had the discretion to collectively, through the
Governing Council, set monetary policies and independently issue Euro notes while the ECB had
no say in either setting interest rates or even function as a lender of last resort. The European Union
was in reality a decentralized economy in core but designed in a way to show otherwise with
responsibilities granted to only make the ECB “a torso of a central bank”. With increasing
international suspicion by institutions like the International Monetary Fund about the obscurity of
the ECB’s central role in the EU, the Governing Council decided to add ECB representatives to
the Committee but that was not enough. The Governing Council tirelessly tried to perfect the
masquerading of the ECB as a central monetary authority by granting it more half-baked
responsibilities, and that includes the printing of money and funding NCB’s. However, none of
the previous functions were actually carried out but rather put on paper and obscurely mentioned
in the ECB’s balance sheet. Heinsohn described it as: “a mere statistical allotment of the ECB’s
twelve mothers to their helpless daughter is turned into the rare case of dowry given by the
daughters to their parent”49
What Heinsohn stressed on the most was the missing lending-of-last-resort figure in the
ECB’s monetary framework. He said “the most bizarre violation of the principles of central
banking in the design of the Eurosystem is the simple omission of the very rationale of a central
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bank, its responsibility as lender of last resort.” 50 Not only did that worry Heinsohn but the
International Monetary Fund was the first institution to note and say “the lender-of-last-resort
responsibility has not been assigned to any institution in EMU; consequently; there is no central
provider or coordinator of emergency liquidity in the event of crisis” 51 To keep in mind, Heinsohn
wrote this paper more than a decade ago, thus his pool of reference about recessions in
decentralized economies was exclusive to the Federal Reserve System pre-1935 and the Great
Depression. He uses the collapse of the banking system in the United States during the Great
Depression as a prime example to the potential threat the EU faces in the future. Moreover, in
comparison with the Federal Reserve System pre-1935, the EU system is found highly unstable.
Heinsohn noted that the lender-of-last-resort arrangement in the U.S. was relatively better than the
EU since the Bank of New York had the discretion to carry out such duty. While the “decentralized
organization of the Eurosystem leaves neither NCBs nor national governments clearly responsible
for supervision of Pan-European banks for ensuring EMU-wide financial market stability.”52 That
is, however, a problematic approach since leaving NCB to adequately asses the risk of contagion
by printing their own Euros and tailoring their respective monetary policies would “create an
uneven playing field and introduce different levels of moral hazard across EMU.”53
Hence, for Heinsohn, decentralized economies have no real monetary backbone as they not
only lack the presence of a regulatory body to facilitate and monitor bank activities but also a
safety net for liquidity in the times of crisis and that is a lender-of-last-resort figure. Banks who
were not fully centralized like the New York Bank before the Act of 1935 found itself incapable
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of bailing out Wall Street when it was “bleeding money on an unprecedented scale.” Although
sister banks like the Chicago Bank had plenty of excess reserves to lend out, it was skeptical that
without a central monetary authority to reimburse it, it would face massive losses. The Board from
Washington at that time did not enjoy enough discretion to force banks into lending one another
and ending the Prisoner's Dilemma the banking system faced when it hit recession. Therefore, in
Heinsohn's words: “as long as there is no lender of last resort in Euroland it will face the problems
rampant in the pre-1935 Fed.”54 Interestingly enough, five years after Heinsohn wrote his piece,
the EU faced its first financial shock with the global crisis in 2008. At that point Heinsohn's
suspicions were met as the EU’s lack of any central backbone manifested in the absence of a lender
of last resort. Countries like Greece had to receive bailout packs from international institutions and
neighboring countries contingent on specific recovery plans which to a lot of economists was
considered as counterproductive. This instance showed the fragility of the EU monetary model as
the financial crisis that took off in Greece was barely stopped from spreading to all other periphery
countries. The quasi-decentralized system that Heinsohn had several issues with its structural built
was put in questions by numerous economists and politicians all over the world.
Heinsohn was not the only economist to tackle the nature of decentralized economies,
Charles Albert Eric Goodhart, one of the most involved economists in the topic of central banking,
also explained why the economy, and the banking system in particular, needs a central bank. It is
useful to start by quoting Goodhart when he said that “from a neoclassical, Walrasian, position
wherein all markets clear perfectly and there is a unique stable equilibrium, it becomes extremely
difficult to see any necessary role for a Central Bank”55 However, in his chapter “Why Do Bank
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Need a Central Bank” from his book Money, Information and Uncertainty, Goodhart discusses
two issues in depth simultaneously. The first revolving the orthodox claim that markets enjoy a
self-stabilizing mechanism if left with no government intervention or any other exterior force to
disturb it. The latter issue is complementary to the proof that free markets are not perfect and from
that stems Goodhart’s argument for the need of central banks.
He begins his argument by pointing out that “inadequacy and insufficiency of information”
is inherent in markets which in return makes them imperfect. That eventually leads to the argument
that an outside force is needed to reduce the effects of asymmetric information and make sure to
prevent unfair competition between market participants. 56 Goodhart views information as just
another commodity on the market that is obtained by who can afford it. It is then clear that special
knowledge is provided to the people who are willing spend money on it making it “only available
for few participants in the market and thus establish an unfair race between different races.” The
information Goodhart refers to is what it requires both the customer and seller to acquire in order
to make the best purchase or investment. Those who enjoy the capital to gather and process market
and consumer information will most likely make more sound decisions than those who do not. It
is then possible for some corporations to be more knowledgeable of market indicators in terms of
quality and prices than others which in return gives them an edge in the competition. Not only is
it a threat to fair competition but asymmetric information given that “clients seeking their services
are naturally at an informational disadvantage”57 might compromise the general wellbeing of the
public with the presence of marketing schemes since it is “easy to appeal the gullible by promising
to offer a higher yield.”58
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Economists like Hayek and those who come from a similar school of thought defend free
markets by claiming that eventually reputation will filter those who either scheme or provide
inferior service by the process of trial and error costumers undergo. This stems from the
assumption that as time goes by customers will identify those who offer suboptimal prices or
provide poor services and those businesses will automatically cease for their incompetence.
Following that trail of logic market participants would have no incentive to misinform their clients
because it might reflect on their sales since it might hurt their reputation. This is a classic argument
from free market supporters as it all eventually boils down to pursuing self-interest. It then goes
against the self-interest of corporations to ignore their customers’ needs since the intensity of the
competition will leave little margin for businesses to disappoint. However, Goodhart responds by
saying that this only holds true if the relationship between both the seller and potential buyer was
to be “repeated and repeated continuously, then reputation might, indeed, suffice to maintain the
stability of the system. In practice, however, these conditions do not occur.”59 There are several
reasons why the “reputation theory” fails to be met in practice.
To begin with, Goodhart raises a valid point about the inconsistency of the relationship
between businesses and consumers. Some industries that include specialized professions that
usually have “infrequent dealings” with clients like doctors, lawyers or real estate agents charge a
lot of money for a one-time advice or deal. Not only do these professions have a lot of impact on
the client’s well-being, especially those cases regarding physical health or involving law issues,
but they rarely counter the same customers twice as people do not often seek medical or real estate
advice. To continue with the example, it is then possible for a doctor to claim the discovery of a
“miracle cure” and be on his way after numerous consumers have already paid considerable
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amounts of money. Secondly, the increase in marketing schemes correlates perfectly with the
rising intensity of free-market competition. Businesses will find new marketing means to gain an
edge over their competition. This includes the branding and re-branding of products, which makes
it more difficult for the average consumer to not fall in the same scheme twice. This goes hand in
hand with what Goodhart described as “free riding.” Well-established businesses with a decent
reputation might invite other corporations to tag along in the same market and thus grant
themselves the opportunity to sell for those who are oblivious about the differences in quality and
brand. This proves that market participants, especially from the consumer’s end, need some outside
entity to ensure their financial and physical safety. That responsibility belongs to an institution like
a central bank that implements regulations to prevent unfair competition and protect consumers
from market predators.60
Another reason why an economy might require the presence of a central bank is for the
sake of sustaining the continuity and soundness of the commercial banking system. This falls into
the “microeconomic function” of a central bank which Goodhart later expands on. In a freebanking market, the neoclassical model that is, where competition is fierce, businesses, or banks
in this example, might form a “club” in which they run collectively to increase their market power
by pooling their resource to offer better services. This might include better interest rates, easier
accessibility and deposit insurance for their customers. However, a club of banks might also lead
them to “indulge in anti-competitive, cartel agreements, exaggerating restrictions on entry beyond
what is desirable, and fix prices, commissions, interest rates in an oligopolistic fashion.”61 This is
one of the three reasons Goodhart believes why the banking system needs a centralized monetary
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authority. The other two have to do with insurance issues as he thinks any insurance plan will need
state level of discretion to both implement and maintain. This is because any sort of client behavior
management and monitoring will require jurisdiction that is only enjoyed by the state. This
includes keeping a record on client’s activities to prevent any intentional misuse by insured parties
since compensation fees might give incentive for moral hazardous actions.
When discussing central banking several discussions surface and that usually revolves
around the lender-of-last-resort function and the issuance of currency. For the sake of this research,
I will be discussing the debate revolving the latter and that is the sovereignty of currency and the
act printing it. There has been a long standing debate on the origins, nature and function of money.
One on end, those who support centralized economies often agree that issuing currencies should
be left monopolized under the central bank. However, those who support a free banking economy
argue that currency, like any other commodity in the market, should be left for the private sector
to produce and distribute.
Lawrence H. White is one of the most cited economists in writings involving free-banking and
privatized currency issuance. His piece Competitive Money Inside and Out discusses in depth why
monopolizing money is unbeneficial and if anything costly. Being a strong advocate for freemarkets, White offers a strong case for de-monopolizing money and transform the responsibility
central banks have to the market. White begins his argument by mentioning that before economies
were centralized and governments stepped in forcefully, money was produced and owned by the
market namely the banking system. He raises this point to prove that the central bank phenomenon
was implemented by the state instead of naturally emerging unlike prior banking system that
“clearly would have emerged in the absence of the state interventions of past centuries.” It is then
a public central bank run by the authority that required unnatural measures to establish and sustain
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because “no private firm under open competition could have monopolized the issue of banknote
currency and permanently suspended convertibility for its bank liabilities”62 A central bank on the
other hand, with the state power, is able to do both things just mentioned.
The core of White’s argument, however, stems from his critique of how money is perceived
in our current system. He says what economists use “to justify government production of a good,
or regulation of its private production, is to argue that the good in question is a ‘public good’”63 It
is then easy for economists who are supportive of government intervention to defend central banks
by discussing money in the context of a public commodity. Once that is established it becomes
obvious why money should be only handled by a public state owned institution like the Central
Bank. However, in reality, according to White it is “obvious that money- being simply an asset
generally accepted in payment- is not a public good64.” He supports this claim by reviewing the
nature of money and showing why it does not fit the definition of a public good. He says:
Money satisfies neither the non-rivalness-in-consumption criterion nor the nonexcludability criterion associated with the public goods: The money one individual own is
excluded from ownership by anyone else, and the liquidity services provided by that money
cannot simultaneously be enjoyed by anyone else.65
After he establishes the idea of money as a private commodity like any other goods sold or
bought in the market, he proceeds to talk about currency within the context of a free-money system.
Within that discussion White shows how money issuance, like any other business in a free
competitive market, would only strive to become better. White also recognizes the ambiguity that
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comes with a free money economy as several systems might eventually emerge. Although he
personally advocates a free banking system producing a unified currency he finds that any model
with no money sovereignty would be more beneficial than the current monopolized money system.
Once money is viewed as a produced good that is owned and sold privately, it becomes easier to
see why the creating of it should be privatized as well. If money was to be left for the market to
distribute and produce the nature of the practice would completely change. Currency then becomes
a part of the neoclassical model where equilibrium is independently reached and so the invisible
hand would eventually dictate the supply and demand of money in the economy. As explained
earlier by Dowd; banks will have no incentive to produce more or less than required because they
will have the obligation to redeem returned notes. White’s faith in free money economies does not
only stem from the technicalities of such models but from the general benefit of the free market
practice itself. He says “only through the competitive process can we discover what sorts of outside
money, and what ways of supplying it, are best suited to consumer preferences”66
Lastly, White addresses those who support money monopolization with the argument that
only the government has the power to unify money and its forms which is beneficial as that will
reduce informational burdens on transistors, to which he counters by saying:
The argument […] holds equally against proliferation of a variety of products or brands in
any industry. It amounts to arguing that too much choice makes life difficult for consumers
and ought to be suppressed by governments choosing for them.67
It is then obvious now that White finds free competition as the only model in which producing
money, like any other commodity, would take its most efficient and creative forms due to the
urgent need for businesses, or banks in this case, to constantly do better in order to stay in the

66
67

Ibid., 289
Ibid., 292

Awartani 44

market. The practice of making money might advance to other ways and change models depending
on the demand and wants of the public but that will only happen once money cease to be
monopolized by the government. And according to White, economists who are supportive of our
current model will often “claim that government can produce a money with desired characteristics
that private firms cannot produce” he counters, however that “there is no evidence that this is the
case, although there is plenty of evidence that a government monopoly can stay in business
producing a money worse than any private producer would” 68
Nevertheless, in her piece Money, Power, and Monetary Regimes, Pavlina Tcherneva
argues that history tells otherwise. The assumption that economists like Dowd and White so
heavily rely on to complete their theory is that money was first created to serve as a medium of
exchange and to facilitate barter. This assumption buttresses the orthodox narrative that money
was property of the market until governments intervened and monopolized it through force, which
consequently proves that money itself is a market phenomenon, and that our current model strips
it from its natural trait. There is yet another conclusion that is born out of this assumption, and that
“the state’s appropriation of private monies […] must be constrained at all costs, as the state (it is
claimed) has the perverse incentive to overspend and debase the currency”69 All these economic
myths resurface frequently whenever the economy goes through recession as it gives a chance for
mainstream economists to blame the state’s monetary policy. Specifically policies that involve the
government running a deficit spending since it is believed to devalue the currency and cause
inflation. Arguing against this theory would require debunking the history which forms the
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backbone of the neoclassical school of thought. Through a brief review of history of money and
currency Tcherneva was able to illustrate that money is “not only not a ‘creature of the market’
but […] instead a ‘creature of the state’” 70
Before elaborating on why money is a public phenomenon here is the definition in which
Tcherneva used to carry out her analysis. Coming from a Chartalist approach, she said money is:
A power relationship of a specific kind, namely a social credit-debt relationship, that is
codified by some authority or institution of power” later she continues to say “far from
being a simple medium of benign exchange, the history of money as a creature of the state
indicates that it is instead a means of distribution, a tool of transferring real resources from
one party to another, subject to the power relationship of the specific historical context71
There are several key points made by Tcherneva that are vital to address in order to better
understand the relationship between money and the state. First, it is important to note that the use
of money in past civilizations was mainly due to social (people amongst each other) and political
(people with the state) commitments. Discussed in detail by Goodhart in his chapter Two Concepts
of Money: Implications for the Analysis of Optimal Currency, and briefly touched on by
Tcherneva, is how money was mostly used to either meet government or social dues. Goodhart
said “money frequently played an initial means-of-payment role in inter-personal social and
governmental roles before it played a major role as a medium-of-exchange in market
transactions.”72 He backs this up with a series of examples of different reigns from ancient times
to our current day that used money in the form of taxation or used by the people for social purposes.
Taking one of Goodhart’s examples for the use of money within social obligations:
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One early function of money, wergild, was to set a tariff, whereby (the relatives of) the
initial offender could recompense the damaged party. This practice spread to other interpersonal relationships, (bride-price, slaves), in some cases before formal markets and the
use of money in trade arose. 73
Interestingly enough, in some countries, especially the Middle East, people still use money to settle
down feud by paying “A’atweh” or compensation money to the families they did wrong, in order
to stop further violence. Another monetary phenomenon that illustrates the use of money to pay
social debts is the “Mahr” or dowries as a bride-price paid by the future groom to the bride’s
family. All these practices did not only survive centuries as part of tradition but they are currently
embedded in the constitution for most of these countries. Moreover, with the early beginnings of
Islam as a religion which later on opened the way for one of the largest empires in history, the
principle of “Zakaat” was introduced as a mandatory practice on every Muslim citizen. Zakat is
“an obligatory tax required of Muslims, one of the five Pillars of Islam. The zakat is levied on five

categories of property—food grains; fruit; camels, cattle, sheep, and goats; gold and silver; and
movable goods—and is payable each year after one year’s possession.”74 This example, like many
others, supports Tcherneva and Goodhart’s argument that money is a creature of the state rather
than a tool born out of markets to facilitate barter. It also sheds light on the role of the state as an
agent of coordination as it has the jurisdiction to enforce laws to ensure the settling of these debts.
Zakaat was implemented and collected by institutions created by the Caliphate government to
enforce and implement the paying of these dues.
The Zakaat is also a prime example of another point mentioned in Bernard Lietaer’s report
called Money and Sustainability: The Missing Link in which he examines the relationship between
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the current nature of money and monetary regimes. However, in his analysis of the institutional
framework of power he says that “the primary purpose of taxation is to create demand for a
currency that has otherwise no intrinsic value”75 The same way the Islamic Empire gave value to
coins at the time through Zakaat; modern states “impose compulsory debts on the population and
determine how they will be settled.” 76 That compulsory debt, like the wealth percentage paid to
the Caliphate state more than ten centuries ago, is in the form of taxes in our current economy.
This goes to further show that the money has and is a creature of the state. In all these different
Islamic traditions where money is used to settle social debts, the respective sovereign power was
the one to impose, supervise and facilitate the transaction between one another.
To further study the relationship between money and state sovereignty, we take Colonial
America as an example of an emerging government with no sovereign power over its currency.
During the British mandate over the Americas, local colonies started printing their own notes. Each
state issued its own currency with its respective value. In that time, US colonies enjoyed the
freedom of running internal monetary policy which in return made them more independent both
politically and economically from Britain. In response, the British government issued the Currency
Act of 1751 and 1764 prohibiting American colonies from issuing their own currency. After the
French Indian War, the British government wanted to both tighten its grip over its colonies and
increase its revenues given the considerable debt it had after the war.77 With American colonies
printing their own currency, the British government had increasing difficulty raising taxation
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revenues from the colonies. The American currency also imposed exchange costs as it was used
for purchasing imported goods from British merchants. From a political point of view, the issuing
of currency by Colonial America was granting it more sovereign powers as it was reducing its
dependence on Britain. In the absence of a sovereign currency, Colonial America’s only source
for pounds was by trading with Britain or borrowing from its banks. Thus, it was in Britain’s
interest to ban all other currencies but the pound as legal tender for tax payments and trade.
78

However, it is believed that one of the main reasons behind the American Revolution was the

devastation that came with the Currency Act as it left America’s economy in a strait jacket.
Americans had no cash to trade with one another and taxes were soaring every time the government
borrowed money from British banks due to the high interest rates.79
Arguably, the case of Colonial America, monetary wise, is very similar to Palestine now.
The Palestinian Monetary Authority much like Colonial America, is prohibited from issuing its
own currency. The Paris Protocol, listed in it the right for the PMA to be a lender of last resort and
to issue Palestinian currency, has slowly transformed into another Currency Act as it limits the
duties and discretion of the PMA as a central bank. The current duties of the PMA as seen in the
previous chapter mostly revolve around minor regulatory tasks but a central bank as discussed by
Goodhart and Gerald Epstein has a lot more to offer. In his piece Central Banks as Agent of
Economic Development, Epstein discusses the contributions of central banks in developing
economies throughout history including first world countries like the United States, Europe,
United Kingdom and Japan. He acknowledges the lack of general consensus from economists
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regarding the functions of a central bank but believes the following are agreed upon by the
majority:
(1) unifying and issuing the country’s bank notes; (2) acting as the government’s bank; (3)
acting as the commercial banks’ bank; (4) serving as a lender of last resort to the banking
and even the financial system as a whole; (5) Conducting monetary policy to manage the
foreign exchanges and the price level […] (6) conducting monetary policy to manage the
overall level of economic activity and (7) allocating credit to promote national goals. 80

The PMA, however, does not have the discretion to carry out any of these functions as it lacks the
autonomy to print money or run open market operations. Moreover, in his paper, Epstein discusses
how central banks took part in helping states to achieve political and economic sovereignty through
acting as “development agents”. Such roles include financing the state and its spending needs.
Epstein offers examples in which central banks played a key role in financing states in times of
war and crisis, such as the Bank of England financing the British government during the
Napoleonic Wars. Another example is the period during and after World War II when:
Central banks became, once again, important institutions for financing and managing
government debts accumulated during the war; and after the war, central banks also became
important tools for rebuilding and restructuring national economies and providing for
social needs, often under government’s direction.81
In political circumstances like that in Palestine, a financial role such as this is needed more often
than not. In the last five years Palestine had two wars in Gaza which left the population and the
city infrastructure devastated. However, the PMA as seen in the previous chapter, was only able
to help as much as its mandate allowed. The PMA offered some regulatory easing and minor
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financial services to save either the banking system or the public sector. Unlike countries like the
United States or any other that faces such tragedy, the Palestinian economy including the
government, does not have a financial safety net for urgent aggressive spending. Although both
the Paris Protocol and the Palestinian Authority issued Law 1997 recognize the PMA as the
governments and commercial banks’ bank, it falls short in meeting that responsibility due to its
limited jurisdiction. It is thus unable to perform one of the central bank’s very core responsibilities
and that is to provide liquidity in times of absolute need. This leaves Palestine, both economically
and politically under the mercy of outside finance to cover its needs. For example, in 2006, the
political party Hamas won in democratic elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council after
Fatah had run it for more than twenty years. In retaliation, Israel, along the U.S. and its allies,
raised sanctions against the new Palestinian governing party. Israel’s sanctions included the
holding of Palestinian tax revenues, tightened border movement, and stopped all Israeli bank
transaction going to the West Best, and vice versa. In economic terms, that means the complete
freeze of Palestine’s main source of Shekels which is the dominant currency in the public sector.
Consequently, the Palestinian economy went through a liquidity crisis. That meant the shutting
down of most public institutions including ministries, schools and hospitals. To worsen the already
tragic situation, the government’s main source of income, foreign aid that is, was also ceased.
Thus, the Palestinian government went bankrupt as all its means of income were disrupted.
According to Mohammad Samhouri:
The decision by Israel in mid-February 2006 to withhold the transfer of Palestinian indirect
tax money to Palestinian Authority coffers (an average of about $60 million a month),
along with the suspension by Western donors of their direct financial support of the PA
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budget (an average of $30 million a month), almost overnight resulted in a hefty 50% drop
in the total funds available to finance PA monthly expenditures 82
This of course, extended the crisis to the private sector as public consumption sunk since most
people in Palestine depend on public sector jobs which ceased making wage payment. If the Paris
Protocol was to be properly implemented, the PMA would be able to support the Palestinian
economy by targeting public consumption through expansionary measures which in return would
at least soften the effects of exogenous politics on the Palestinian people’s welfare.
Another contribution for central banks in developing economies is their ability to allocate
credit and resources to facilitate growth in specific sectors in the industry. Epstein stresses the
importance of such role, especially in economies like those of England and the U.S:
All central banks, including the Bank of England and the U.S. Federal Reserve have used
direct means to support economic sectors. And this has not simply been a matter of
historical aberration, but rather, it has been an essential aspect of their structures and
behavior for decades on end. In particular, a crucial role for both the BOE and the Fed has
been to promote the financial sector of their economies, and especially, to support the
international role of their financial services industries. They have done this by using
subsidized interest rates, legal restrictions, directed credit and moral suasion to particular
markets and institutions 83
However, in the case of the PMA such tools are very limited if available at all. The monetary bank
figure in Palestine does not have the capabilities to carry out special financial packages to stimulate
growth in targeted sectors. Although the PMA has tried several financial easing methods to
encourage growth in the banking sector, especially in the times of crisis, it could not provide
directed credit or government subsidizes in the times of need. The only monetary transmission
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mechanism the PMA has is its ability to set required reserve ratios for banks. Shaker Sarsour
discussed this in depth as he tried to illustrate the relationship between exogenous monetary
policies and the real economic indicators in Palestine. First he defined monetary transmission
mechanisms as: “the process through which monetary policy actions and decisions are transmitted
into changes in output and other economic activities.”84 He then proceeds to discuss how the PMA
affects real change in the economy through the monetary tools it possesses. Interestingly enough,
Epstein touched on the use of variable “asset based reserve requirements” as a widely used method
by central banks to conduct monetary policies. He said this “requires bank to observe minimum
reserve requirements based on the assets they hold, but the central bank varies these to promote
lending to desired sectors. They do this by allowing lower required reserve rates on privileged
assets” 85 According to Article IV of the Paris Protocol, the PMA is the authority with the power
to grant and announce liquidity requirements on all deposits in banks operating in Palestine. Thus
leaving reserve requirements as the “only possible monetary policy through which the PMA could
achieve its ultimate objective of price stability and growth sustainability” 86
Unlike all the different central bank roles Epstein discussed in his paper, from credit
control, distribution of sources and allocation, the PMA can only perform a fraction of that. The
PMA cannot set interest rates through discount rates or carry out open market operations, but it
could encourage lending through minimizing the required reserve ratio. Of course, if it wants to
decrease lending due to inflation targeting measures, it would increase the required reserve ratio
thus leaving banks less margin to make deposits. However, according to the endogenous theory of
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money, banking activites, including lending and borrowing, are independent from available
reserves. Although the PMA uses this tool to the best of its ability, it however does not have the
discretion to carry out the most basic central bank duties. According to Goodhart, the “essence of
Central Banking lies in its power to create liquidity by manipulating its own balance sheet” 87 The
PMA is then lacking the very essence of a central bank figure and that is the freedom and leverage
to control its liabilities and credit distribution. Consequently, it is unable to conduct monetary
policies, maintain price stability and control inflation, tackle unemployment, and most importantly
“support the State’s financing needs at times of crisis.”88
The Paris Protocol, an unfair marriage between Palestine and Israel in all means, was
obviously structured to compromise the sovereignty of both Palestine’s political and economic
affairs. It is important to draw the relationship between political independency and currency
sovereignty. Similar to Colonial America, the British mandate declared the Currency Act for
numerous political and economic motifs that are all summed up in its interest to control its
American colonies by first establishing an economic dependence on the British economy and
second by assuring the inability of America to run its internal affairs. This applies to every country
that went through colonization including India, Syria and Palestine included. All these countries,
except Palestine who is still suffering the repercussions of colonialism till this day, succeeded in
breaking free from its colonial power. However, in most cases, the decolonization was rather
complicated and that could be seen by the sequence of monetary regimes these countries adopted
throughout the process. The reason behind such complications is due to the attempts by the colonial
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power to prolong its hegemony. Tcherneva said “often, the former colonial power would slow
down the process of political independence […] by instituting monetary arrangements that would
undermine it”89 She illustrated such tactics by examining the case of India which used its own
issued currency, rupees, since 1862. Until the British mandate fully dissolved, India, like most
colonized countries then, functioned under a currency board that would peg its currency to the
Pound sterling. However, looking at all these examples, it becomes obvious that nothing short of
state’s full currency sovereignty will grant a country’s political independence. As Tcherneva
noted:
The very formation of the modern nation state has been inextricably linked with the process
of establishing a unified sovereign national currency, which underscores the salience of
having the ability to conduct the internal affairs of a nation, independently from external
influence90
It thus becomes evident that the purpose of the Paris Protocol was far from the intention to
“establish a sound economic base for Israel and Palestine […] by the principles of mutual respect
of each other’s economic interests, reciprocity, equity and fairness.”91 On the contrary of laying
“the groundwork for strengthening the economic base of the Palestinian side and for exercising its
right of economic decision making”, the Annex designed a Palestinian economy where the
government along its monetary authority are completely reliant on Israel’s political and monetary
sphere. The absence of a Palestinian currency is one of many symptoms of a colonized country.
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Policy Implication
As concluded earlier, the monetary case of Palestine is very political in its nature. Thus,
when discussing policy implications, one cannot ignore the sovereign limitations imposed on
Palestine. A lot of literature offers alternative monetary regimes for the Palestinian economy but
few take into consideration the lack of discretion the government has to implement such changes.
Under the Oslo Agreements “the Palestine Authority is debarred from issuing its own currency as
is constrained to remain dependent on a number of externally issued currencies”92 For this reason,
we rule out whether Palestine is better off with a national currency or not, but rather, we examine
possible alternative monetary regimes which the Palestinian Authority has the jurisdiction to
implement. Such scenarios include functioning under a currency board, which would leave the
Palestinian economy in a very colonialist-like structure, and thus defeating the very purpose of
adopting new regimes. Another plan would be for the Palestinian government to fully dollarize its
economy similar to countries like Ecuador or El Salvador. Although such arrangement would not
necessarily grant the Palestine Authority more freedom to operate and run its internal affairs, it
however softens the impacts of not being able to do so. Nevertheless for the purpose of weighing
the different outcomes for such monetary regimes, we start with the latter, dollarization that is.
Dollarizing the Palestinian Economy
According to Karnovitz, the “concept of dollarization […] refers to the full and official
adoption of the United States Dollar as the currency used as legal tender for public, private
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transactions, contracts, and bank accounts”

93

Then, for a dollarized Palestinian economy, the

government has to declare the U.S. dollar as legal tender and most importantly as tax currency.
However, if one is to observe other dollarized economies, a very unique feature surfaces regarding
the case of Palestine. Countries like Ecuador and El Salvador who have been running under a
dollarized regime for nearly two decades now, were both very interconnected with the United
States’ economy prior to the dollarization act. Ecuador, for instance, exports most of its oil to the
United States and thus receives all its payments in dollars. On the other hand, El Salvador is not
closely tied to the United States by trade agreements but “a large component of its GDP derives
from dollar denominated remittances.”94 Which acts as a main component for dollar income. Those
two examples do not apply to Palestine since it neither has trade agreements with the United States
nor does it receive considerable amounts of dollar denominated remittances. However, the
Palestinian Authority receives all of its foreign grants in dollars which contributed to
approximately 36.7% of its total revenue in the year 2014. The lack of a central bank figure or any
sort of monopoly over currency makes Palestine a unique case of economic independence. Ecuador
and El Salvador both had their sovereign currencies prior to the dollarization act, whereas Palestine
has never been granted such freedom so far. Consequently, the Palestinian Authority has been
dependent on dollar denominated foreign aid since its establishment in 1994. Although such
reliance hurts the fiscal stability of Palestine, it however, adds to the dollarization rationale since
the income of dollars in Palestine has been somewhat consistent. Karnovitz presented a list of
advantages and disadvantages for dollarization in general. Starting with the benefits of
dollarization, they can be listed as such:
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 Reduced administrative costs although such costs are not overwhelmingly high in the current
framework the PMA functions under since it lacks the discretion to fully administrate its
economy. However, if the Palestinian economy was to be dollarized it will ultimately rule out
the ambiguity in the PMA’s confused mandate.
 Reduced risk of inflation Palestine has been importing its inflation from Israel since the Paris
Protocol. This perpetuated Israel’s influence on Palestine as it further compromises the PMA’s
ability to carry out inflation targeting policies. As Sarsour stated, “inflation in Palestine is
partially a function of Israeli prices. Hence, inflation targeting policies in Israel transmit
themselves in the Palestinian economy.” 95 Although dollarization will not necessarily change
such phenomenon, since Palestine will remain importing its prices and inflation variable from
exogenous monetary policies. However, as Karnovitz put it: “assuming the continued stability
if not robustness of the US dollar, a dollarized economy would eliminate currency exchange
risk and would send a strong signal to foreign investors that government policy is geared to
long term growth and stability”96
 Reduced interest rates having a three currency system with constant fluctuation among their
values push banks to charge higher interest rates to compensate the risk of lending or holding
deposits. Sarsour mentioned:
Rates are high compared to deposit lending rates in USA, Jordan, and Israel. This high
margin is justified by the fact that there is no national currency and so the PMA cannot
affect and does not intervene determining the interest rate; banks claim to be facing high
risks therefore they increase the interest rate on loans and offer a low rate on deposits.97
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However Karnovitz argued that “the adoption of a more stable currency would eliminate currency
risk and result in lower costs of borrowed capital, and could serve to promote additional investment
and economic growth”98 Then one could assume that dollarizing the Palestinian economy would
help eliminate risks associated with currency exchange which in return would reduce interest rates
in the banking system.
 Stability and integration Palestine would benefit much more integrating its economy had it

established any trading agreements with the United States. Dollarizing facilitates exports going
to the United States and vice versa.
While the costs attributed to dollarization can be seen as:


Loss of seigniorage benefits



Loss of independent monetary policy



Diminished role in preventing domestic bank failures



Political and other symbolic costs
All the setbacks mentioned by Karnovitz following dollarization are being experienced

with the current monetary regime. The PMA does not collect seigniorage from neither the
Jordanian Dinar nor the Israeli Shekel circulating in the West Bank and Gaza strip. As mentioned
before, the PMA cannot act as a lender of last resort or manipulate discount rates, which would
completely limit its ability to prevent domestic bank failures. The PMA cannot properly conduct
monetary policy either. As discussed by Sarsour earlier the PMA’s only monetary transmission
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mechanism is its ability to determine required reserve ratios which, according to the postKeynesian school of thought, is ineffective.
Currency Board System
The Palestine-Israel Journal reviewed the history of the Palestinian monetary system for
the purpose of comparing the current model to monetary regimes prior to the Israeli Occupation.
In British-Mandated Palestine, a currency board system (CBS) was constructed and the Palestine
Pound was issued against 100% sterling reserves. According to PIJ, Palestine had more monetary
freedom functioning under a CBS than the current Paris Protocol produced system. They said,
“The Palestinians have established the Palestinian Monetary Authority (PMA) which, according
to the Paris Economic Protocol, is less than a Palestinian currency board system.” 99 The PIJ
reviews the period when colonized countries like India and Palestine functioned under a currency
board system. During those times, the British provision over the CBS to maintain full and free
convertibility for the local currency into sterling, according to the PIJ was “extremely effective in
preventing governments from resorting to domestic borrowing in order to finance their expenditure
and, hence, contributed to the economic stability of countries under the CBS” (insert footnote,
website) Although such limitations might protect Palestine from undergoing inflation caused by
poorly executed expansionary measures, it however, keeps the PMA’s framework compromised
and restrained. The PIJ acknowledges some of these setbacks, they said:
From the view point of the currency-issuing country, some disadvantages can be found
from adopting the CBS. The monetary authority would be deprived of any authority to
issue currency on discretion, or to control the activities of commercial banks, since most
of these would be in favor of keeping most of their deposits in foreign assets abroad. The
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100% reserve requirement would also deprive the country of using its reserve abroad in
executing development projects. 100
However, as mentioned before, these restrictions would have been highly considered had Palestine
currently enjoyed full monetary sovereignty. Instead, with the limitation of a currency board
system included, Palestine would still have more leverage in conducting monetary policy than the
present regime. Thus, if Palestine was to hypothetically construct a CBS and adopt the Jordanian
Dinar as the reserve currency it would benefit in several ways. First, if the Jordanian Dinar is
stable, which it has been in the last decade, the Palestine Currency Board currency would be stable
as well. This would boost confidence in the currency and thus encourage local investments and
financing. Secondly, unlike any other monetary arrangement (with the exception of issuing a
national currency) the currency board system would be able to extract some of the seigniorage
which would be otherwise collected by the Central Bank of Jordan. The topic revolving
seigniorage has been widely discussed by economists who studied the Palestinian monetary
system. Numerous economists attempted to estimate the seigniorage revenues extracted from the
circulation of the dinar and shekel in Gaza Strip by the Central Bank of Israel and the Central Bank
of Jordan. All these different studies agree that if Palestine was to collect some of the seigniorage
revenues made by the currencies circulating the West Bank and Gaza Strip, it would greatly add
to the government’s revenue which in return would increase its ability to expand its development
budget. Thirdly, a PCB would gradually increase public confidence in Palestine issued notes,
which in the long run would set the infrastructure for a fully sovereign national currency. The
rationale behind constructing a currency board system is that it would not only grant relatively
more freedom to implement monetary policy but to prepare and bring Palestine a step closer to
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issuing a national currency. If the same efforts shown by the PMA now to prove its competence
amongst international institutions, was put in running a currency board, then it would gradually
gain it more discretion as it proves itself trustworthy. PIJ noted that:
Once this system is established and proves efficient, it would be made more flexible by
allowing the reserve requirements to be less than 100%. In such a case, the PCB, defacto
the PMA, would be able to extend credit to banks and to issue notes with some discretion,
i.e., the PCB would gradually turn into a monetary authority in the tradition of central
banks. Even though such a flexibility of the PCB to create money would be limited, it
would control inflation which prevents the need for devaluation and speculative attacks on
the PCB’s notes101
Thus, if the PCB continues to show consistent progress it has the potential to ultimately become a
central bank in the same manner former currency board systems did. Nevertheless, such monetary
transition will require much more than just decent performance since, as shown earlier, a lot of
politics is involved when it comes to either the political or economic sovereignty of Palestine.
There is no definite policy the PMA can adopt to better the current monetary system since
all these alternatives fall short into fitting the Occupation’s political discourse. For this discussion
to become more fruitful, a political reform, starting with the Paris Economic Protocol, should be
implemented. As the PIJ stated: “A national currency issued and controlled by the Palestinian
Monetary Authority is the only way out.” 102 In respect to ultimately fulfilling that objective,
establishing a currency board system seems to be the most strategic monetary regime. Unlike a
dollarization plan, the PCB can be abandoned if it turns out to be a failure, while dollarizing the
Palestinian economy is a much greater commitment. As Karnovitz noted: “Because of the large
impediments to reverse course once it is implemented, official or full dollarization is considered a
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permanent decision”103 A PCB is far from perfect, but it at least sets the course for a potential
sovereign monetary system in the future.
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Conclusion

When I first decided to pursue research to seeking answers to questions few have asked, I
did not know what to expect. I was certain of one thing: I was embarking on a challenge to find
truths about a reality that I, and hundreds of thousands of others, share. Finding empirical data and
evidence about monetary policies in Palestine was difficult, but confronting the results was even
more difficult. Many times I doubted the purpose of this research. Not out of principle, but out of
mere helplessness.
When people think of oppression, they think of the tangible realities that manifest
themselves in apparent violence. It is true, the Occupation has erased most of Palestine and its
history. It took land, dispersed people, imposed segregation, set checkpoints, and continues to strip
every bit of identity a Palestinian has. But it did more than that. As history taught us, oppression
comes in infinite shapes and forms. Beyond the bloodshed and violence is a system that defines
the living standards of every Palestinian. Ours is an economic system designed and tailored by the
Occupation to assure the stagnation of an entire civilization, with the intention to perpetuate its
hegemony and domination.
Never had I thought about how oddly alien the idea of having a national currency is for the
average Palestinian, because I dreamt about it too. Only when I came to the United States did I
realize that, just like in any sovereign country, a currency is something everyone enjoyed the
liberty of having – a liberty unfortunately not shared by the Palestinian people. This research,
however, allowed me to view currency beyond just a symbol of statehood. Having a national
currency is one of the many imperative components for economic prosperity. For decades now,
Palestine’s economy has been a bubble, inflated and burst in accordance with the will of others.
The Paris Protocol was written to create a Palestine with no economic backbone. It struck the
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perfect balance between giving Palestine just enough discretion with a half-baked central bank,
combined with a cocktail of currencies to make its economy run, while absolving Israel from
responsibility for its stability, but not enough discretion to allow it to strive.
There is a reason why all past colonial powers compromised their mandated countries’
ability to print their own currency or conduct monetary policy. It is the same reason why every
colonized country sought the freedom to do so. As shown earlier, a state’s sovereignty goes handin-hand with its monetary independence. A government cannot function without having a central
bank figure to support its finances in times of need. Furthermore, a central bank needs a sovereign
government for it to have the discretion to operate at its maximum capacity. If it is true that history
repeats itself, then similarly to the American Revolution against the British Mandate and every
other country that had to settle with anything short of full monetary and fiscal autonomy, Palestine
should and will demand for a reform, starting with the Paris Protocol. As rooted and
institutionalized as the Occupation is, time will call for a drastic change, as the current colonial
regime only continues to provide the harshest of economic circumstances to Palestinians.
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